Author: Michele Geraci

  • Shenzhen Is Not Yalta. That Is Exactly Why It Matters.

    The Financial Times argues that Putin, Trump and Xi cannot become the new “Big Three” because today’s world is profoundly different from that of Yalta in 1945. I agree with the premise, but not with the conclusion.
    Several months ago, I had already drawn the analogy with Yalta. But it is precisely in the differences between the world then and the world today that the central point of my analysis lies.
    The objective of a multipolar world is not to replace one hegemon with three hegemons. It is to build an international order in which no power can unilaterally impose its will on the others.
    I am writing these reflections from China, where I am currently based. Over the years, on different occasions and at different times, I have had the opportunity to meet and speak directly with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. I certainly do not claim that these meetings, which took place years ago and in different contexts, allow me to know their current intentions. But they offered me an uncommon opportunity to observe closely three political personalities, three ways of conceiving power and, above all, three different visions of their countries’ roles in the world.
    To these personal experiences, I add years of work across economics, diplomacy and international relations, particularly in relations between China, Europe and the United States and, more recently, Russia. It is also on the basis of this experience that I am increasingly convinced of one thing: multipolarity is not the problem to be solved. It is the reality to be recognised and, if properly managed, can become the greatest opportunity to build lasting peace.
    The Real Issue: The United States Must Accept Relative Decline, Not a Decline in Its Prosperity
    Realist theory in international relations teaches us that stability does not arise from moral declarations, ideological crusades or the ambition to export one’s political system. It arises from the balance of power, credible deterrence, mutual recognition of security interests and respect for the red lines of other major powers.
    Multipolarity alone does not guarantee peace. But it can create the conditions for a more stable international order, provided the great powers accept its logic. And this brings us to the fundamental point.
    The United States must learn to accept a reduction in its relative power without confusing it with absolute impoverishment. America can remain extremely wealthy, technologically advanced, militarily powerful and prosperous even in a world where China grows, other countries develop and America’s share of global GDP declines.
    There is no economic law stating that Americans’ well-being must depend on Washington’s ability to dominate the rest of the planet.
    The risk of conflict arises when a dominant power attempts to prevent the relative rise of others. This is the classic problem of hegemonic transition: the danger is not necessarily the rise of the challenger, but the reaction of the power that fears losing its primacy.
    The alternative is not American defeat. It is American adaptation.
    And Trump, precisely because of his transactional approach and his weaker attachment to some of the ideological rigidities of traditional foreign policy, could have the opportunity to manage this transition in the interests of the United States itself.
    China and Russia: Recognising Red Lines Does Not Mean Agreeing on Everything
    China must be able to continue its economic development without automatically being considered a threat simply because it becomes more prosperous and influential. At the same time, Beijing must pursue its security interests without turning economic competition into military confrontation.
    Russia’s strategic concerns, particularly those related to NATO expansion and the European security architecture, must also be addressed through serious negotiations and mutual guarantees.
    Recognising another power’s security interests does not mean automatically approving all its actions. It means understanding a fundamental principle of international relations theory: no country can indefinitely build its own security upon the perceived insecurity of others.
    This is the security dilemma: what one country considers a defensive measure may be perceived by another as a threat, fuelling a spiral of rearmament, mistrust and possible conflict.
    Diplomacy exists precisely to interrupt this spiral. This is not wishful thinking, nor naive pacifism. It is geopolitical realism.
    Ukraine: Three Strategic Winners and One Major Loser
    We have not had a Third World War. But the war in Ukraine has accelerated the transformation of international power balances.
    My assessment, certainly open to debate but grounded in an analysis of long-term strategic interests, is that the United States, China and Russia are, for very different reasons, the three principal beneficiaries of the geopolitical realignment produced by the conflict.
    This does not mean that each has gained in every economic, military or political dimension. It means that all three retain, or have strengthened in certain respects, their central role in defining the future international order.
    The European Union, by contrast, risks being the great loser. Not only because of the economic and energy costs it has borne, but above all because of an astonishing sequence of self-defeating decisions, strategic mistakes and an inability to develop a genuinely autonomous foreign policy.
    We have sacrificed industrial competitiveness, increased strategic dependencies and reduced our diplomatic room for manoeuvre, without managing to translate these sacrifices into greater international influence.
    Shenzhen: Not a New Partition of the World, but a Possible New Equilibrium
    It is in this context that I consider the possibility of a meeting between Trump, Xi and Putin in Shenzhen.
    Whether or not it produces concrete agreements, its geopolitical significance could be far greater than that of individual trade deals.
    I imagine that the substance of a possible trilateral dialogue could be summarised as follows.
    To China: Your economic growth is a reality that cannot be stopped by decree from Washington or Brussels. Continue to grow, but ensure that your rise remains peaceful and recognise the security interests of others.
    To Russia: Your strategic concerns and red lines must be incorporated into a new European security architecture, based on reciprocal commitments, deterrence and credible guarantees.
    To the United States: You do not need to dominate the world to continue prospering. You can maintain a leading economic, technological and military position, protect your fundamental interests, including in the Western Hemisphere according to a logic of regional influence, and accept a more balanced international system.
    Naturally, these are not unilateral concessions. Every recognition of interests and red lines must be reciprocal, negotiated and accompanied by verifiable commitments.
    Peace does not arise from the absence of competition. It arises from the ability to compete without turning every disagreement into an existential threat.
    Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have demonstrated a long-term strategic vision and continuity of direction that depend not only on their personalities, but also on the institutional structures of their respective countries.
    Trump, for his part, might understand that genuine success for the United States does not consist of attempting to restore an increasingly costly global hegemony, but of negotiating a new American position in a world that has already changed.
    An America that is relatively less dominant, but absolutely prosperous, secure and influential, would not be a defeated America.
    It could be a stronger America, because it would be less committed to bearing the costs of an international order it can no longer control alone.
    And Europe?
    The European Union could have represented a fourth pole: autonomous, economically strong and diplomatically credible. It could have acted as a bridge between the great powers, rather than contributing to deepening divisions.
    Instead, it has too often chosen strategic subordination, ideological rigidity and economic policies that ultimately harm its own businesses and citizens.
    The result is that, while Washington, Beijing and Moscow discuss the future world order, Brussels risks having neither the strength nor the credibility necessary to participate in defining its rules.
    At Yalta, in 1945, Europe’s fate was discussed by the great powers.
    In Shenzhen, in 2026, we risk witnessing something similar. With one difference.
    Europe is not invited to the table. It is merely a spectator. A spectator who, in the end, also pays the bill for the other three’s dinner.
    And this, more than the return of Yalta, is the real failure of European foreign policy.
  • Brussels Has Chosen a Negotiator Who Does Not Want to Negotiate

    If you wanted to design an appointment that guarantees no negotiation will ever take place, you could hardly do better than what is now being prepared in Brussels: handing the EU’s Russia file to Kallas, a politician whose stated ambition is to break Russia into smaller states.

    This is not a detail. It compresses the entire method of European foreign policy into one name. A negotiator accepts that the other side exists, has interests, and will still be there when the talking is over. Someone who wants to dismantle the country across the table is not a mediator. They are a belligerent with a chair and a nameplate.

    And because Kallas is in charge of the file, her stated aim cannot be waved away as a personal opinion. What she says is, in effect, EU official policy. President Putin may therefore perceive—rightly—that the European Union has adopted as formal policy the break-up of Russia. If that is the EU’s position, Russia would see Brussels as an impediment to any peace process. Moscow should refuse to meet her, and it would be right to do so.

    It is also worth asking what is supposed to be negotiated. Russia has done nothing to us. The European Union inserted itself into a war that does not belong to it, then cut every diplomatic channel with Moscow, and made negotiation impossible by its own hand. A Union of Peace would have spent these years as mediator. Ours spent them as a participant, and now looks for someone to conduct the talks it destroyed the conditions for.

    And this is no accident of personnel. It is the culmination of a strategy that has failed on its own terms, publicly, for years. I have said for five years that sanctions against Russia were an epic failure, and I take some satisfaction that the message has travelled as far as Moscow. Twenty-one packages, the latest adopted in July 2026, each presented as the one that would finally bite, each producing the same result. Brussels responds with another package, on the road of failure, because that is the modus operandi—getting everything wrong and calling it principle.

    So when I look at the choice of chief negotiator, I do not see incompetence alone. I see a coherent position: the goal is not a settlement, it is the transformation, or the break-up, of the other country. That is a regime-change policy, and regime-change policies do not end in treaties. They end in exhaustion, in resentment, and in the decline of the powers that adopt them. It is due to people like this that empires fall.

    Why does such a line survive every piece of contrary evidence? My friend Desmet, in his book, has an answer that fits our political class: people have lost the capacity to analyse and take positions mainly out of the need to feel accepted by their friends and acquaintances—often against their own interest. He calls it mass totalitarianism. I recognise it; I did a version of it myself as a teenager. Today it is the operating system of an entire foreign policy, and anyone who points at the results is treated as an accomplice rather than a critic.

    And the true enemy of European peoples is not Russia. It is the ignorance, incompetence and arrogance of most of our leaders, in Brussels and member states—ignorance and arrogance being the same thing. Those leaders are not defending our values. Paradoxically, it will not be this Commission that preserves them.

    Which brings us to Italy. We have no quarrel with Russia, and no interest in a crusade dressed as morality: twelve packages of Italian arms have gone to Kyiv since 2022. When a minister admits that Italians are against continuing to finance and arm that war—61 per cent, in a Eumetra poll conducted in September 2026—and then says he will go on anyway, we are no longer in a democracy, but in a democracy with Italian characteristics: I am the king, and you can get lost.

    So Italy should say no, clearly and in public. No to a negotiator whose programme is dismantling the country she is meant to negotiate with. No to further sanctions packages whose only measurable effect is on our own firms and households. No to the pretence that Ukraine is fighting for our democracy, when what is defended is the Brussels bureaucracy’s idea of itself.

    We should demand a mandate for settlement rather than transformation, restoration of diplomatic channels, and bilateral dealings wherever our national interest is at stake—treating Brussels as a liability to be minimised, not a compass. This is not neutrality between good and evil. It is the minimum a sovereign country owes its citizens: not to be dragged into someone else’s war, under someone else’s flag, for someone else’s reasons.

  • Nvidia’s Real Risk Sits in the Boardroom, Not in the Courtroom

    Nvidia's Real Risk Sits in the Boardroom, Not in the Courtroom

    The market is once again staring at the wrong screen. When Nvidia drops eleven percent in a session and the chief executive's name trends for reasons that have nothing to do with silicon, the commentary writes itself: the bubble, the litigation, the private life. All of it is noise. The two things that actually matter are duller and far more dangerous — a governance structure creaking under the weight of its own success, and a software moat that China is quietly draining one generation of chips at a time.

    Start with the boardroom. Nvidia has become the centre of gravity of the entire artificial-intelligence economy — in October 2025 it became the first company in history to reach a $5 trillion market value — and it is starting to look like a financial ecosystem unto itself: circular finance, a myriad of investments in small companies, guarantees extended here and there, and those same small companies coming back as customers. Add employees in open revolt and a palace coup inside the board of directors, and you have a set of headlines that, for any normal company, would be a curiosity. For the company whose chips effectively price the future of the world economy, they are a systemic event.

    The point is not that Nvidia is a fraud. The point is that when a firm's revenue is partly financed by its own balance sheet — in November 2025 Nvidia announced it would put up to $10 billion into Anthropic, a customer — the market loses its independent yardstick. This is the oldest problem in finance dressed in new clothes: an asset must generate future cash flows to be worth something; without them there is only a price, never a value. A share price held up by circular flows of capital tells you about the flows, not about the value. And when internal governance wobbles at the same moment — a restive workforce, a board at war with itself — the correction, whenever it comes, arrives without a shock absorber.

    Then there is the moat. Everyone treats CUDA as permanent, like a language nobody can stop speaking. It is not. The most interesting development is that AI models running on CPUs and GPUs are already producing partial alternatives to CUDA. Partial today. But in software, partial has a habit of becoming sufficient. And the Chinese are not waiting for anyone's permission. While Washington debated export controls, Beijing kept building 7, 5 and 3 nanometre-equivalent capability. The sequence was almost comic: America announces it will not sell advanced chips; two years later China answers that it will ban the imports itself, because it now makes them at home. A ban designed to slow a competitor became the forcing function for its independence.

    This is what I have argued for years about Chinese planning. It behaves like a very large company with a board that writes plans with clear objectives and deadlines, and then meets them. You can dislike the system; you cannot ignore the delivery. Every node they reach narrows Nvidia's addressable market from the top — China still accounted for $17.1 billion of Nvidia's revenue in fiscal 2025, and its data-centre chips now barely sell there — and every alternative compiler narrows it from below.

    Meanwhile, the press devotes itself to the chief executive's love life. A strange country, this one, that can seize a head of state, kill another nation's religious leader, foment wars for decades, decide European foreign policy and sustain genocides — and then discover that two lovers put the greatest technological revolution of the century at risk. And the revelation that one of them was an employee? At the top of a company that size, everyone is an employee, a supplier or a client. If that is the scandal, the scandal is arithmetic.

    None of this is an argument about the next quarter. It is an argument about where to look. If you want to know whether Nvidia deserves its place at the centre of the world, skip the court filings and skip the gossip columns. Read the board minutes and read the compiler stack. Watch whether the guarantees and the small-company investments turn into genuine external demand, and watch how fast the "partial" alternatives to CUDA become the default in the places where most of the world's AI will actually be built.

    And if you want to read those signals yourself, there is a lesson I keep repeating: study engineering, mathematics, physics. Not finance, not business, not whatever is fashionable this year. Thirty-five years after my own degree in electronics engineering, it is still what lets me tell the difference between a share price and a technology.

    The litigation cycle will pass. The gossip will pass. The governance and the moat will not.

  • Trade Policy Is Flying Blind. Here Is the Instrument Panel.

    The global economy is fragmenting. Tariffs are back. Energy flows are political. Chinese investment is watched like a weather system. And yet most of the debate is conducted with anecdotes and a single number: the bilateral trade deficit.

    The European Union's negotiation with China is the clearest example. The outcome was none, and the reason is simple: the whole basis for the negotiation is flawed. The EU continues to perceive a large and growing trade deficit with China, which came to €304.5 billion in goods in 2024, as something that hurts Europe and favours China. That is not an accounting identity. It is an assumption. A deficit is a symptom to be investigated, not a verdict to be announced. Without data, the EU is negotiating with a mirror.

    That is why I have spent recent weeks building six interactive tools on global trade, tariffs, energy, oil and gas, and Chinese investment. They are free and built on real data. One will be released every three days; the first goes live this week. The trade tool covers 25 years, from 2000 to 2025, all countries, 100 product groups, and regions from the G20 to ASEAN, the EU, Mercosur and the African Union. This is not a specialist luxury. It is the minimum equipment for anyone who wants to argue about trade seriously.

    The first lesson is that trade is a network, not a set of bilateral balances. Look at the 2024 G20 flows and ask which country sits at the centre. Most people guess wrong, because they think in pairs: who sells to whom, who owes whom. The map shows centrality, chokepoints, and the difference between being connected and being dependent. A tariff is not a wall. It is a change in the price of a link in the network. You cannot see the effect without seeing the network.

    The second lesson is that deficits are not proof of being cheated. The United States runs a trade deficit with almost every country in the world and in almost every product category, except energy, where it has been a net exporter every year since 2019, according to the US Energy Information Administration. If a bilateral deficit were proof of exploitation, the US would be the most exploited nation on earth and would have to tariff everyone on everything. The data exposes the absurdity. China, meanwhile, runs a trade deficit of USD 450 billion in energy products. The country accused of mercantilism is also a giant net importer. These are the basic facts any serious tariff policy must confront.

    Tariffs have measurable effects, and data can show them. When the EU-Japan free trade agreement began cutting tariffs in February 2019, Italian exports to Japan grew 19.7% over that year. That is not an argument for or against tariffs in general. It is an argument for knowing what they do. The same applies to energy and Chinese investment. If Europe wants to discuss de-risking, it needs to know which value chains are vulnerable, which products are concentrated, and where Chinese capital actually goes. At the WTO, the discussion has moved toward global value chains, domestic value added and the industries most exposed to decoupling. That work is impossible with a headline and a hunch.

    The fragmentation is real. ASEAN is pushing the use of local currencies for trade among its members and with its partners. The EU and ASEAN operate in different modes. Mercosur's exports are concentrated in a few markets. Italy's trade surplus is mostly with countries outside the EU: in 2024 it ran a surplus of €65.1 billion with non-EU markets and a deficit of €10.2 billion with its EU partners, because that is where growth is. Each of these facts is a data question before it is a political one.

    The answer is not to hand trade policy to technocrats. It is to put the data in everyone's hands: free, interactive, real. Then argue. Then negotiate. Then vote. But first, look at the map.

  • Nvidia’s Chips Power the AI Economy. Its Shareholders Now Power the Lawsuits.

    Let us start with what is not in dispute. Everything we are being told about the coming economy — the data centres, the models, the automation, the entire architecture of the next decade — is possible only because of Nvidia chips. That is not a marketing line: the company shipped more than 90 percent of the GPU-equipped servers sold worldwide in the last quarter of 2024, on IDC's count. It is a fact of industrial geography, and Jensen Huang deserves the credit he gets for having built it.

    And then came the lawsuit.

    Shareholders are suing the man who multiplied their share price fifteen times in three years, because the stock fell five percent. Read that again. The same investors enriched by the AI story are now suing the author of the story over a single bad session. This is not ingratitude, and it is not greed in any ordinary sense. It is the clearest signal yet that the AI chip boom has changed phase.

    The reason is valuation. At three trillion dollars — one and a half times the GDP of Italy — Nvidia is no longer a company whose price is set by what it sells. It is a claim on the future, and it got there by decupling in eighteen months and overtaking Apple as the most valuable company in the world. Someone who put ten thousand dollars in at the end of the last century would be worth sixty million today. Numbers like that do not describe a business. They describe an expectation, and expectations have owners who want them defended.

    Here the dotcom comparison is instructive. After the internet bubble, two stocks told two stories: the company that made the switches and hardware, and the company that used those switches to sell books and everything else to ordinary people. The lesson is not that hardware is bad. The lesson is that the firm which sells the future and the firm which uses the future are priced on entirely different logic — and shareholders eventually discover, usually at the worst moment, which one they actually own.

    On top of that sits politics. Nvidia's demand is not set in a market; it is set in a chancellery that decides how much of China — 13 percent of Nvidia's revenue in the year to January 2025 — the company is permitted to sell to. Washington bans exports to China and the stock drops seven percent. A later round of restrictions sends the shares down again just as they were recovering. Then a robust quarter arrives and the price still falls after hours, because from China come loud anti-Nvidia signals. Beijing finally answers the export bans by prohibiting imports of advanced chips and announcing that Chinese firms will use their own — which they have been building, Huawei's HiSilicon among others, exactly as the boomerang logic of sanctions predicted. Meanwhile, when Gulf states want to buy, we are invited to worry about what "autocratic" governments might do with the hardware. The customer list is vetted by politics and the supplier is lectured by politics. That is not a stable revenue base. It is a diplomatic variable with a ticker symbol.

    Which brings us to governance, the real subject of that lawsuit. When a company's price depends on export licences, on a decision in Beijing and on the mood of a US administration, the shareholders' complaint is not really about one quarter's guidance. It is that they were sold a growth curve as though it were a law of nature. Making the shares rise fifteenfold is not a crime. But in a litigious market, success at that scale stops being a defence and becomes an exhibit.

    And the American model of risk has already been settled: in the banking scare, where 94 percent of Silicon Valley Bank's deposits sat above the insurance limit at the end of 2022 and were made whole anyway, and in the Evergrande parallel, the small savers were protected while shareholders and bondholders were not. That is a defensible way to settle accounts. But it teaches every equity holder that he is first in line to lose — and therefore first in line to sue. Expect more litigation, not less. Expect disclosure, guidance and executive pay to become weapons in the next round.

    Nvidia's chips will keep powering the new data economy, politics permitting. But the next front in the tech war is not the fabrication plant. It is the courtroom and the quarterly call. Building a factory that never produces a single chip is one kind of risk; pricing in a future that must be delivered every ninety days is another. And Europe, which enters this story only through diplomatic courtesies and holds roughly 10 percent of the global semiconductor market, is not competing on either front.

  • The Sabotage Nobody Explains and the Conversation Nobody Is Allowed to Have

    There are two things happening in Europe at the same time, and they reinforce each other. The first is a wave of sabotage and mysterious attacks for which an explanation is demanded, except that the explanation is never actually sought — only a culprit is assigned. The second is a taboo, increasingly enforced, on speaking with Vladimir Putin or with anyone whose ideas and actions we do not share. Together these two habits are dragging Italy into a confrontation with Russia that serves no Italian interest whatsoever.

    Start with the sabotage. The number of suspected sabotage operations in Europe nearly quadrupled between 2023 and 2024, to more than thirty, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. When something blows up, the honest first question is the simplest one: who benefits? Would it be Russia? Ukraine? Or someone else entirely? This is not a provocative question, it is the elementary question of any serious investigation. Yet it is barely asked in public, because the answer has already been written before the inquiry begins. And once the culprit is fixed in advance, the facts stop mattering — what matters is whether you nod along. Anyone who raises the question is not treated as a sceptic but as an accomplice.

    That is how the second taboo operates. Refusing to talk to Putin is presented as a virtue, as if diplomacy were a reward for good behaviour rather than an instrument for protecting your own country. It is the purest form of guilt by association: if you sit at the same table as someone, you must secretly agree with him. By that logic, no negotiation, no ceasefire, no arms control agreement would ever have been possible in the history of the world. You negotiate precisely with people you do not like, because those are the people with whom there is something to negotiate.

    Jeffrey Sachs made this point plainly: real diplomacy means meeting all the parties involved in a conflict, and the European Union has done the opposite, refusing dialogue with Putin and with Lavrov. That is not toughness. It is a grave error, and Europe is paying for it. Sachs has spent around thirty years working on Russia, meeting in person the leaders in the Kremlin, in Washington and elsewhere, and reporting what he saw and heard. He is dismissed by people who have never crossed a border and who cannot get past the slogan that there is an aggressor and an aggrieved — as though a phrase learned by heart were the same thing as a history lesson.

    The same quality was on display in the conversation with Sachs and Massimo D'Alema. Two men who would fit, many times over, into the space that current European leadership leaves empty. What they offer is not softness towards Moscow but a different intellectual instrument: the recognition that we are living in a multipolar world, that no single bloc can dictate its terms, and that in such a world the country that keeps talking is the country that keeps its options. When Sachs debated the new multipolar order for two hours with students in New York, the room was full and hungry for it. The young have already moved into that world. European officialdom has not.

    So the question must be put bluntly, without embarrassment: why exactly is the European Union trying to wage war against Russia? Not to defend Ukraine, not to deter, not to negotiate from strength — but to wage it, as a project in itself. Italy has no quarrel with Russia. Italians did not choose this confrontation and will not gain from it. They will pay for it in energy, where in 2024 industrial electricity prices were 11% above the euro-area average, according to the Italian energy regulator. They will pay for it in industry, where Italian exports to Russia fell from 7.7 billion euros in 2021 to 4.3 billion in 2024. And they will pay for it in freedom of speech at home, where even artists and athletes are now expected to pass a loyalty test on whom they are allowed to admire.

    Italy should want two things, and say them loudly. First, that every act of sabotage be investigated honestly, with the question of interest asked before the verdict. Second, that the telephone be picked up. Talking is not capitulation. It is what sovereign countries do when they refuse to be passengers in someone else's confrontation.

  • Can a Democracy That Resets Every Two Years Win the Chip War?

    Forget the "blue wave" for a moment. The contest between Democrats and Republicans is the least interesting part of what happens after the midterms. The deeper question is whether the United States, with governments that legitimately change every two or four years, can build a long-term vision for the country and compete with the planned economy of China and, to a lesser extent, the wider Global South, the BRICS and the countries tied to the Belt and Road Initiative.

    Artificial intelligence and semiconductors are the test case. These are not industries that reward a four-year horizon. Chips depend on supply chains, talent, energy and capital commitments that mature over decades. A strategy that is launched by one administration, rebranded by the next and reversed by the one after is not a strategy. It is a series of slogans with a budget attached.

    China does not have this problem. Its Party guides the economy, society and the moral direction of the country with a very long view, and it does not have to look over its shoulder at the next round of local elections. We have seen what that means in renewables: for three years running, China has installed more solar capacity than the rest of the world combined, and in 2025 it accounted for 57% of all new solar installed worldwide, according to SolarPower Europe. Nobody should be surprised. When planning is not interrupted by electoral calendars, a country can look beyond the next vote and organise its industrial independence. The same logic applies to AI. China has been investing in it for years, and its new language models already appear to rival the best American ones: by February 2025, Stanford's AI Index found, the best American model led the best Chinese model by only 1.70% on the Chatbot Arena leaderboard.

    America's answer so far has been impressive in size and fragile in structure. A $500 billion, four-year investment plan for AI infrastructure was announced in January 2025. But an announcement is not a commitment that survives the next election. The real question is whether the plan outlives the political mood that produced it, or whether AI and chips become hostages of the quarrel between left and right, each side treating the technology as a weapon against the other rather than as a national asset.

    The latest news shows how easily this happens. The CEO of Nvidia, Jensen Huang, is to be questioned in the Senate over alleged links to people close to China. Whatever the outcome, the signal is damaging. Doing business in high technology has become extraordinarily delicate precisely when the country needs its most successful technology companies to be confident, ambitious and globally present. We have seen this tension before: when Gulf states bought Nvidia chips, the headlines worried less about the commercial success than about what "autocratic" governments might do with them. Markets cheered, politicians fretted, and no one explained how a coherent strategy could be built on both reactions at once.

    This is the paradox at the heart of the tech war. Washington is waging it against China and, in practice, against much of the rest of the world. But a war fought with export controls, suspicion and public hearings has a cost, and the first bill lands on American companies, American investors and American researchers; Nvidia alone booked a $4.5 billion charge in the quarter ended April 2025 after Washington required export licences for its H20 chips. I fear that the United States is, in the end, also fighting against itself.

    This does not mean that democracy is doomed or that the Chinese model is simply superior. It means that democracies must be honest about their structural weakness and design around it. If governments change every few years, then the long-term elements of strategy, such as chips, energy, skills and basic research, need a degree of continuity that does not depend on who wins. That requires a serious debate about where to draw the line between State and Market: which sectors, which geographies, which supply chains, how to compete with China and with the rest of the world, how to handle AI and economies of scale. It requires a holistic approach, and that is exactly what is missing.

    The midterms will be analysed endlessly as a verdict on one party or one president. That is the wrong lens. The verdict that matters will be delivered in a decade, in fabs, data centres and laboratories, and it will go to whoever managed to keep a plan alive across many elections. The United States has the talent, the capital and the companies. What it must prove is that it has the patience.

  • Democracy Is Judged by Process and Results, Not Only by Ballots

    When tension between great powers rises and a country faces difficult problems at home, the first thing a society needs is direction. That is the starting point for understanding the role of the Chinese Communist Party. Its guidance is not a decorative feature of the Chinese system. It is the organising principle that lets China think beyond the next news cycle and the next election, and that matters more as the international environment becomes less predictable.

    Western commentators usually reduce the debate to one question: do citizens vote for their leaders? If yes, the system is a democracy. If no, it is not. But this is a thin definition of a very old idea. Democracy comes from demos and kratos, power to the people. The real question is whether a system serves the people, not whether it performs a particular ritual every few years.

    In China, citizens do not choose their ministers or their members of parliament. I have said so plainly, and there is no point pretending otherwise. It is better described as an ex-post democracy. Instead of asking the public to pick a team and then hoping for the best, the system is judged afterwards on what it delivers. Policies are tested, results are seen, and the legitimacy of those in charge depends on whether people's lives improve, as when 98.99 million rural residents were lifted out of extreme poverty by the end of 2020. This is what the Chinese government's own White Paper on democracy points to when it speaks of a democracy that works. The emphasis is on the process of governing, not only on the moment of selection.

    Now compare this with what we see across Western democracies. The electoral ritual is intact, yet something has been hollowed out. Many European politicians, and certainly many of those in power in Italy today, are not primarily trying to help their citizens. They are trying to keep their jobs. That is not a conspiracy theory. It is the simple logic of a system in which survival in office has become the main objective, and in which the vote is a licence to be renewed rather than a mandate to be honoured.

    The problem is even clearer in supranational institutions. The European Union is one of the least democratic bodies I have come across, less so even than the Chinese Communist Party. It is run largely by the leftovers of national governments, people who are not accountable to any voter in a meaningful way. Its top diplomat is a symptom of the larger issue: an institution that speaks loudly about values while remaining largely irrelevant in the world. A system can hold elections and still fail to give its people either representation or results.

    This is also why the conflict of our time is not only between East and West. It is between ordinary people and elites within Western countries themselves. Citizens who vote for change find that little changes. Citizens who protest find that those in power are more concerned with managing their image. The distance between the governed and the governing has grown, and the ballot box has not closed it.

    The Chinese model has its own demands. Years ago the implicit pact between government and population was simple: we run the country, and you can make money. That bargain was enough for a time, but the situation today is different. The challenges are more complex, from an ageing population, with 23 percent of people now over 60, to a more hostile external climate, and the Party's role in guiding the country through them carries greater responsibility. Italy and China, in fact, face similar questions about who will pay for a growing dependency ratio, with about 39 people over 65 for every 100 of working age in Italy and about 23 in China. The difference lies in how each system is organised to answer them.

    This is the heart of the argument. A system that can set a long-term course, hold itself to results, and keep the state pointed in one direction has real advantages when the world becomes volatile. Western democracies are entitled to their traditions, but they are not entitled to assume that their model is the only legitimate one, especially while their own institutions struggle to serve their citizens.

    It is time to compare the two models honestly: not electoral form against authoritarian caricature, but process against process, and result against result. On that basis, China's approach deserves far more respect than it usually receives.

  • Italy Should Not Die for a War That Is Not Its Own

    Every policy should be judged by one question: who pays, and who benefits? Applied to the European Union's confrontation with Russia, the answer is uncomfortable. The costs fall on Italian families and Italian firms. The benefits are hard to find anywhere in Rome.

    Start with sanctions. We were told they would bring Moscow to its knees. Instead they keep producing boomerang effects. The clearest example is Lufthansa, which has stopped flying Frankfurt to Beijing. Because it cannot cross Russian airspace, the flight takes two hours longer, and without enough demand at that price the route no longer makes sense. A European company loses a business line, European travellers lose a connection, and Russia carries on. Multiply that logic across energy, trade and industry, and you see what has happened. Italian manufacturing has been hurt by high energy costs, with wholesale electricity averaging €108 per megawatt hour in 2024 against €78 in Germany and €58 in France, that follow directly from imposing or threatening sanctions on a country that has never done anything to us.

    That last point deserves repeating, because it is the one our political class avoids. Russia has not attacked Italy, threatened Italy or harmed Italian interests. Yet for four years the Meloni, Tajani and Salvini government has voted for sanction after sanction, 21 packages so far, and backed Ukraine's war effort without conditions. It then assures us that it provides only defensive aid, even as Ukraine strikes Russian territory with the help of military and logistical support our government supplies, worth more than €3 billion. Italians are being told to treat a country that never wronged them as an existential enemy. They are never told what they get in return.

    The danger is no longer abstract. The risk of a wider war is not between Russia and the United States, which are sensibly pulling back from direct confrontation. It is between the European Union and Russia. If that is where the escalation is heading, then ordinary Italians are the ones who would be asked to make the sacrifice. I do not accept that. No Italian should be sent to die for Tallinn, and no Italian government has a mandate to commit its citizens to a quarrel between the Baltic states, Poland and Moscow. If those countries cannot settle their hostility toward Russia on their own, that is a problem for them. It is not a reason to put Italian lives and Italian savings on the line.

    Meanwhile the rhetoric keeps rising. Denmark admits it does not know where certain drones came from, but the line that Russian origin is not ruled out is enough to keep fear alive across Europe. NATO talk of choking off Kaliningrad invites a response from a leader who remembers very well what the siege of Leningrad meant. The EU's own head of diplomacy speaks openly of breaking the Russian Federation into many small states. A threat to a country's territorial integrity, made by a senior official and not a pundit, should not surprise us if it is answered. Europe is writing itself into a war and then pretending the other side is the aggressor.

    Recall who sits on each side of today's geopolitical divide. On one side stand Putin, Lavrov, Xi Jinping and Modi, among others. On the other stand Meloni, Von der Leyen, Kallas, Draghi and their colleagues. One side understands that the world has moved from unipolar to multipolar. The other behaves as if Europe's real problem were a Russian menace, when the real problem is a total lack of strategic vision among its own leaders.

    There is a simple test of whether a government is working for peace. When did an Italian minister, undersecretary or prime minister last go to Moscow, or even speak to a counterpart in the Russian government? Governments that want peace talk to the other side. Ours votes for sanctions and hangs up the phone. Even a courtesy greeting to the Russian ambassador was treated as scandal, when it is exactly what a serious country does.

    Italy needs a foreign policy built around Italian interests: affordable energy, a competitive industrial base, open channels with every major power, and no wars it has not chosen. That means saying no to endless sanctions that wound us more than their target. It means refusing to be dragged into a conflict by allies who hate Russia more than they love prudence. And it means demanding that our leaders explain, in plain words, what Italy gains from all this. So far the only honest answer is: nothing.

  • Italy Has No Quarrel With Russia, and Italians Should Not Pay for One

    Italy has no dispute with Russia. We have no territorial claim, no historical grievance and no strategic rivalry with Moscow. Yet we have been steered into a confrontation that costs Italian families and businesses dearly and offers them nothing in return. It is time to say plainly that this policy is not serving the Italian national interest.

    Start with sanctions. Before they were imposed, the obvious questions were never seriously answered. What damage would we inflict, and on whom? Could Russia find other buyers? Russia's main trading partners include China and Central Asia, and Germany and Italy are among its biggest customers, Italy having sourced about 40% of its gas imports there in 2021, while much of Europe barely trades with it. Any sanctions regime that cuts Europe off from Russian energy hurts the countries that were buying it first. The question we asked then, and which was never answered, was how much more Italians would pay in their bills. In other words, what damage were we choosing to do to ourselves?

    The results are in. The financial sanctions did not have the effect their promoters predicted. Energy sanctions pushed up inflation to an average of 8.1% in 2022, with energy accounting for almost 70% of it. Meanwhile, the economic weight of European gas purchases for Russia was always modest compared with what it meant for our own economy. When ENI chose to pay in rubles, it made the sensible decision: keep Italy afloat rather than sink our economy for no gain to peace. Sanctions as practised have even helped finance the war while damaging Ukraine itself. They are, in effect, Putinian sanctions.

    The slogans never change. Each new package, now 22 of them, is announced as decisive, and each is followed by another. Those who defend this approach should be able to list the previous packages in order of their impact on forcing Moscow to withdraw from the territory it holds. They cannot, because nobody can point to an effect that matches the rhetoric. When officials declare that sanctions are extraordinarily effective and Russia's economy badly weakened, they are falling into a psychological trap: deciding first, analysing never, and sending the bill to Italians.

    The same absence of strategy marks the military policy. The formula repeated by European leaders is to keep arms flowing and keep increasing economic pressure, with peace to come at some unspecified later date. That is not a plan. It is a commitment with no end, no definition of success and no price tag presented to voters. Italians see the sacrifices but not the peace. They are right to feel they are being taken for fools, and they will withdraw support even for measures that might actually work.

    Worse, the government appears not to care. When a senior minister can acknowledge that Italians, only 18% of whom back continuing military aid, do not want to keep backing Ukraine and then confirm that money and weapons will keep going anyway, we have democracy with Italian characteristics: public opinion is noted, then ignored.

    Now add the brinkmanship over the Baltics and Kaliningrad. Pushing a nuclear-armed neighbour into a corner over territory that has nothing to do with Italian security is not deterrence. It is a gamble, and the stake is the lives of Italians. If Italy were ever to find itself at war, Italians should remember who made the political and military decisions that led there. They should know where to begin looking.

    This policy has also been strikingly amateurish. We have paid a high price for measures decided by others, from useless sanctions to shameful bans on artists and writers, and now Italy risks being excluded from reconstruction contracts in Ukraine. We take the losses and others take the spoils.

    There is another way. Early in the war, a semi-neutral stance, like China's decision not to impose sanctions, looked like the best hope for peace, because only a party that keeps channels open can broker anything. Diplomacy requires talking to everyone, not expelling a country from the world economy and from every forum.

    Italy should rebuild its own policy around its own interests: affordable energy, open trade, a genuine search for peace and no automatic entanglement in other people's escalations. Italians should not be asked to pay for a quarrel that is not theirs.