The Financial Times argues that Putin, Trump and Xi cannot become the new “Big Three” because today’s world is profoundly different from that of Yalta in 1945. I agree with the premise, but not with the conclusion.
Several months ago, I had already drawn the analogy with Yalta. But it is precisely in the differences between the world then and the world today that the central point of my analysis lies.
The objective of a multipolar world is not to replace one hegemon with three hegemons. It is to build an international order in which no power can unilaterally impose its will on the others.
I am writing these reflections from China, where I am currently based. Over the years, on different occasions and at different times, I have had the opportunity to meet and speak directly with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. I certainly do not claim that these meetings, which took place years ago and in different contexts, allow me to know their current intentions. But they offered me an uncommon opportunity to observe closely three political personalities, three ways of conceiving power and, above all, three different visions of their countries’ roles in the world.
To these personal experiences, I add years of work across economics, diplomacy and international relations, particularly in relations between China, Europe and the United States and, more recently, Russia. It is also on the basis of this experience that I am increasingly convinced of one thing: multipolarity is not the problem to be solved. It is the reality to be recognised and, if properly managed, can become the greatest opportunity to build lasting peace.
The Real Issue: The United States Must Accept Relative Decline, Not a Decline in Its Prosperity
Realist theory in international relations teaches us that stability does not arise from moral declarations, ideological crusades or the ambition to export one’s political system. It arises from the balance of power, credible deterrence, mutual recognition of security interests and respect for the red lines of other major powers.
Multipolarity alone does not guarantee peace. But it can create the conditions for a more stable international order, provided the great powers accept its logic. And this brings us to the fundamental point.
The United States must learn to accept a reduction in its relative power without confusing it with absolute impoverishment. America can remain extremely wealthy, technologically advanced, militarily powerful and prosperous even in a world where China grows, other countries develop and America’s share of global GDP declines.
There is no economic law stating that Americans’ well-being must depend on Washington’s ability to dominate the rest of the planet.
The risk of conflict arises when a dominant power attempts to prevent the relative rise of others. This is the classic problem of hegemonic transition: the danger is not necessarily the rise of the challenger, but the reaction of the power that fears losing its primacy.
The alternative is not American defeat. It is American adaptation.
And Trump, precisely because of his transactional approach and his weaker attachment to some of the ideological rigidities of traditional foreign policy, could have the opportunity to manage this transition in the interests of the United States itself.
China and Russia: Recognising Red Lines Does Not Mean Agreeing on Everything
China must be able to continue its economic development without automatically being considered a threat simply because it becomes more prosperous and influential. At the same time, Beijing must pursue its security interests without turning economic competition into military confrontation.
Russia’s strategic concerns, particularly those related to NATO expansion and the European security architecture, must also be addressed through serious negotiations and mutual guarantees.
Recognising another power’s security interests does not mean automatically approving all its actions. It means understanding a fundamental principle of international relations theory: no country can indefinitely build its own security upon the perceived insecurity of others.
This is the security dilemma: what one country considers a defensive measure may be perceived by another as a threat, fuelling a spiral of rearmament, mistrust and possible conflict.
Diplomacy exists precisely to interrupt this spiral. This is not wishful thinking, nor naive pacifism. It is geopolitical realism.
Ukraine: Three Strategic Winners and One Major Loser
We have not had a Third World War. But the war in Ukraine has accelerated the transformation of international power balances.
My assessment, certainly open to debate but grounded in an analysis of long-term strategic interests, is that the United States, China and Russia are, for very different reasons, the three principal beneficiaries of the geopolitical realignment produced by the conflict.
This does not mean that each has gained in every economic, military or political dimension. It means that all three retain, or have strengthened in certain respects, their central role in defining the future international order.
The European Union, by contrast, risks being the great loser. Not only because of the economic and energy costs it has borne, but above all because of an astonishing sequence of self-defeating decisions, strategic mistakes and an inability to develop a genuinely autonomous foreign policy.
We have sacrificed industrial competitiveness, increased strategic dependencies and reduced our diplomatic room for manoeuvre, without managing to translate these sacrifices into greater international influence.
Shenzhen: Not a New Partition of the World, but a Possible New Equilibrium
It is in this context that I consider the possibility of a meeting between Trump, Xi and Putin in Shenzhen.
Whether or not it produces concrete agreements, its geopolitical significance could be far greater than that of individual trade deals.
I imagine that the substance of a possible trilateral dialogue could be summarised as follows.
To China: Your economic growth is a reality that cannot be stopped by decree from Washington or Brussels. Continue to grow, but ensure that your rise remains peaceful and recognise the security interests of others.
To Russia: Your strategic concerns and red lines must be incorporated into a new European security architecture, based on reciprocal commitments, deterrence and credible guarantees.
To the United States: You do not need to dominate the world to continue prospering. You can maintain a leading economic, technological and military position, protect your fundamental interests, including in the Western Hemisphere according to a logic of regional influence, and accept a more balanced international system.
Naturally, these are not unilateral concessions. Every recognition of interests and red lines must be reciprocal, negotiated and accompanied by verifiable commitments.
Peace does not arise from the absence of competition. It arises from the ability to compete without turning every disagreement into an existential threat.
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have demonstrated a long-term strategic vision and continuity of direction that depend not only on their personalities, but also on the institutional structures of their respective countries.
Trump, for his part, might understand that genuine success for the United States does not consist of attempting to restore an increasingly costly global hegemony, but of negotiating a new American position in a world that has already changed.
An America that is relatively less dominant, but absolutely prosperous, secure and influential, would not be a defeated America.
It could be a stronger America, because it would be less committed to bearing the costs of an international order it can no longer control alone.
And Europe?
The European Union could have represented a fourth pole: autonomous, economically strong and diplomatically credible. It could have acted as a bridge between the great powers, rather than contributing to deepening divisions.
Instead, it has too often chosen strategic subordination, ideological rigidity and economic policies that ultimately harm its own businesses and citizens.
The result is that, while Washington, Beijing and Moscow discuss the future world order, Brussels risks having neither the strength nor the credibility necessary to participate in defining its rules.
At Yalta, in 1945, Europe’s fate was discussed by the great powers.
In Shenzhen, in 2026, we risk witnessing something similar. With one difference.
Europe is not invited to the table. It is merely a spectator. A spectator who, in the end, also pays the bill for the other three’s dinner.
And this, more than the return of Yalta, is the real failure of European foreign policy.
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